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Abstract  
 
The principles and findings from internal government audits (aimed at generating 
recommendations to improve compliance with anti-corruption regulations) can greatly 
contribute to the wider anti-corruption literature. Internal audit techniques can overcome 
the weaknesses of the four predominant approaches to evaluating anti-corruption 
regulatory performance – the systems design approach, the ad-hoc controls studies 
approach, the descriptive legal analysis approach and the prescriptive manuals and 
handbooks approach. This paper discusses a compliance audit of anti-corruption 
regulations in an anti-corruption audit conducted in 2009. The audit findings and 
recommendations illustrate the ways that models and previous research in the social 
sciences can be used in the internal audit methodology in order to generate 
recommendations which provide risk-adjusted, positive net benefits for the government 
agency.  
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Introduction 
 
Internal (public sector) audit represents one of the least understood, yet most important 
tools in the fight against corruption – particularly for a customs service. Most people view 
auditors (internal auditors included) as eyeglass wearing bean-counters who look for 
discrepancies in stacks of financial figures. While such an image does reflect the work of 
the internal auditor (particularly during financial and fraud audits), much audit work 
involves the application of creativity – as the auditors try to generate recommendations 
which will generate greater social benefits than costs. Except for Khan (2006) -- as a 
recent and welcome contribution to the literature -- until now, the anti-corruption literature 
has failed to address internal audit methodologies as a way of measuring the performance 
of anti-corruption regulations.1 This paper seeks to remedy this gap in the literature as 
well as build a bridge between the audit profession and academic social science discourse. 
We build this bridge by presenting the results of an internal audit of anti-corruption 
regulations in the Carpatistan Customs Agency conducted by the Administration’s Inte
Audit Department in March 20 2
rnal 
09.    
                                                
 
The audit of regulations which help enforce legislation aimed at requiring civil servants to 
declare their income (and any substantial changes) as well as potential conflicts of 
interests represents a major element in the fight against corruption. The first part of the 
paper will provide a very brief overview of the literature on assessing the performance of 
anti-corruption laws (focusing at the regulatory level rather than the legislative level to the 
extent possible). The second section provides a simplified view of the audit methodology 
– as applied to our internal audit -- for the social scientist not versed in the specifics of 
internal non-financial audit. In that section, we describe the audit methodology generally, 
the laws and regulations guiding our audit and provide the reasoning for many of the 
decisions we took in the design of our audit. The third section presents compliance with 
specific anti-corruption regulations (controls in audit terminology) and recommendations 
which emerged. The fourth section addresses the way which the audit assessed ignorance 
of anti-corruption regulations as an explanation for non-compliance. The fifth section 
describes the way we tackle COSO standards and assess the customs service’s culture of 
compliance. The sixth section describes the way we assess the quality of anti-corruption 
regulations in the customs service and the rationale behind the recommendations the audit 
generated to improve the control of corruption-related risks -- using two particular 
regulatory instruments called the Code of Ethics Regulation and the Regulation on 
Disciplinary Procedures. The seventh section briefly pontificates about the value of non-
financial internal audit techniques and findings for the broader social science literature on 
anti-corruption (and visa-versa); while the final section concludes. 
 
1 Baltaci and Yilmaz (2006) try to tackle the wide-spread lack of understanding of the benefits (or even 
methods) of internal audit in developing country public sector organisations (while briefly mentioning the 
ways that internal audit can detect corruption). The reader unversed in internal audit may see their paper for 
a succinct and useful background.   
2 I refer to Carpatistan to protect the identity of the audited entity. By tradition, I have referred to each 
country as Carpatistan – and the name does not give any indication of the country’s geographical position. 
Citation of laws and audit standards represents the Harvard citation method’s main weakness. Instead of 
following the convention that organisations should be cited in-text, we cite an abbreviated form of the law or 
publication title. For audit standards or other guidance, we cite the actual guidance article instead of the page 
number. 
 
As we promise to build a bridge between the audit profession and academic social science 
discourse, we provide we provide definitions from the audit field as we go along. Audit 
possesses its own terms of the trade (jargon). Internal audit professionals will find our 
treatment of the audit (both in general and in this particular engagement) as unrigorous. 
Social scientists will probably find our translation of social science terms into audit 
terminology as unnecessary and possibly condescending. However, we hope increased 
familiarity with the “nuts and bolts” of non-financial internal audit practices among the 
broader social sciences will encourage greater dialogue between these two disciplines.   
 
The Value of Internal Audit over Other Methods of Assessment 
 
The literature on the measurement of performance of anti-corruption regulations in 
government agencies can be grouped into four categories (as shown in Figure 1). The first, 
and predominant approach, focuses on the way in which audit fits into the larger “anti-
corruption system.” These studies, often abstract in nature -- providing flow charts which 
“show” how audit intersects with other boxes labeled as state institutions -- describe the 
importance of audit in a broader government policy aimed at fighting corruption. While 
acknowledging the importance of internal audit in anti-corruption work, these authors 
rarely demonstrate a detailed knowledge of the actual techniques used by internal (or 
external) auditors. The second approach – usually taken by authors with a background in 
political science and often comparative in nature – focuses on the existence or absence of 
particular programmes in a government agency. Such an approach resembles a controls-
based audit. Authors visit state institutions and ask if these institutions implement 
particular programmes, such as asset declaration schemes. However, such studies tend to 
provide simplistic comparisons and contrasts of the adoption of these programmes. For 
example, Larbi (2007) assesses whether four African countries have adopted conflict of 
interest programmes – using pre-defined programmes and categories.  
 
Figure 1: The Four Approaches in the Literature to Address the Role of Internal 
Audit in Fighting Corruption 
 
Approach and  
Representative Authors 
Description Weaknesses compared to 
internal audit reporting 
Systems design approach 
(Kayrak, 2008; Shah, 2007).  
Discusses the importance of audit 
in preventing corruption (usually 
focusing on the Supreme Audit 
Institution) and how audit “fits” 
into a larger anti-corruption 
framework 
Does not provide concrete 
details about particular audits. 
Provides little practical 
guidance for regulators in 
internal audit departments.  
Ad-hoc controls studies 
approach (de Sousa, 2009; 
Larbi, 2007) 
Assesses corruption risks based on 
the establishment of controls in an 
organisation (usually as assessed 
by interviews and second-hand 
reports). 
‘Controls’ tend to consist of 
whether particular programmes 
are implemented (such as 
complaint hotlines).  
Descriptive legal analysis 
approach 
(Cain et al., 2005; Trost and 
Gash, 2007; Rosenson, 2006; 
Acar and Emek, 2008). 
 
Often historical in nature, describes 
legal issues related to the 
implementation of internal audit 
programmes aimed at detecting or 
preventing corruption. 
Provides only general and non-
operational background; 
particularly in a developed 
country context. 
Prescriptive manuals and 
handbooks approach 
(Nigel and Samociuk, 2007) 
Provides text-book approaches to 
detecting corruption as a variety of 
fraud.  
Too general (and often abstract) 
to apply in practice. Ignores 
other aspects of a wider anti-
corruption programme in place.  
    Source: authors 
 
The third approach – descriptive in nature – focuses on the previous attempts particular 
state agencies have made in the adoption of internal audit practices aimed at detecting 
corruption. For example, providing an extensive background in the legal founding of audit 
in the US, Cain et al. (2005) discuss the difficulties in implementing internal audits aimed 
at detecting corruption in the US. The final approach taken in the literature – often written 
as guidance manuals -- focuses on prescriptive studies. These studies discuss audit 
principles and how they apply generally to the detection and/or prevention of corruption. 
For example, Nigel and Samociuk (2007) provide an excellent overview of the mechanics 
of a fraud audit. However, any discussion of such an audit ignores the wider anti-
corruption programme in place. The internal auditor must know about progressive 
practices the agency can take which go above and beyond the minimum obligations set in 
legislation; as well as changes in thinking about anti-corruption theory and practice.3 
Naturally, such an abstract typology provides ideal-types and these approaches often 
overlap in a particular study. For example, Anechiarico and Goldstock (2007) look at a 
number of Inspectors General in the private sector, tracing their historical background and 
developing a table of their common features. They provide a series of recommendations 
for using these inspectors general in the public sector – particularly when dealing with 
public procurement.  
 
These four approaches suffer from a number of weaknesses as contributions to the 
literature on evaluating anti-corruption regulation performance. First, they fail to focus on 
risk – looking (particularly in the case of ad-hoc control studies) – on the implementation 
of existing programmes. Second, each author may choose a different methodology 
(whereas as we shall see, the internal audit framework provides for a coherent and 
comparable basis for studies). Third, studies based on these approaches rarely, if ever, 
generate recommendations for use beyond the particular study. Findings are either in 
general terms (related to political theory) or point out specific lack of implementation of 
particular programmes. The assessment of anti-corruption programme performance, using 
these methods, requires the comparison of current practice against some normative ideal 
established in the author’s academic tradition -- instead of in comparison to the agency’s 
objectives. In other words, these studies – simply put – fail to address the role of 
compliance with anti-corruption regulations.   
 
Background and Methodology for the Anti-Corruption Compliance Audit  
 
As with any internal audit, the International Standards for the Professional Practice of 
Internal Audit (ISPPIA) guide the anti-corruption compliance audit. Far from being a 
check-list or rigid set of instructions guiding internal auditors, the Standards provide over-
aching principles and general steps which guide the internal auditor during an audit. An 
anti-corruption audit – or engagement – places supreme importance on the identification 
and minimisation of the risk of losses to the agency (Standards: 2120). In the case of an 
anti-corruption internal audit for a government body like customs, the focus rests on the 
potential financial loss or infringement of rights resulting from the use of their public 
powers for private gain.4 In Carpatistan, with imports of roughly $25 billion under the 
                                                 
3 Balia et al. (2007) provide a good overview of both the need to consider wider institutional factors when 
evaluating ethics programmes in government organisations as well as critiques of such programmes.  
4 Customs officials possess, in most jurisdictions, a number of discretionary public powers which may result 
in the bribe-seeking or other corrupt behaviour. Such powers pose a risk to their customs agency. Common 
powers include the right to search goods and persons, question the valuation or origin of goods being 
imported into the country, and the right to refuse the clearance of goods until an importer convinces a 
customs inspector that he or she has completed the customs procedures of that jurisdiction. For a general 
background on corruption in customs, see MacLinden (2005) or Ferreira et al. (2007).  
supervision of the Customs Agency, the possibility of corruption in the organisation’s 
operations could lead to enormous damages from civil cases and in terms of revenue loss.    
 
Legislation provides the legal basis for any administration – such as the Carpatistan 
Customs Agency – to establish anti-corruption procedures, policy and practices (known as 
controls in audit terminology).5 In the mid-2000s, the Carpatistan government passed two 
pieces of legislation which significantly changed the anti-corruption internal audit 
landscape in Carpatistan. From an audit point of view, the Anti-Corruption Law creates a 
number of relatively trivial (and difficult to audit) restrictions – preventing Carpatian civil 
servants from using budgetary funds to finance political activities, acquiring shares in 
companies in which the public official has regulated or supervised, and accepting large 
value gifts. A particularly interesting – from an internal audit point of view – new 
obligation established by the Anti-Corruption Law requires all public officials to declare 
their property upon taking up state service and to report on significant changes. These two 
articles – along with a monitoring mechanism – legally establish a system often referred to 
as an asset declaration programme or scheme.6 
 
The Conflict of Interest Law (2007).represents the other major piece of legislation which 
establishes new (and auditable) obligations on public officials.7 Some of the more trivial 
provisions (in terms of risk to the Administration’s operations) include the prohibition 
from hiring relatives (art. 6), the requirement to place ownership or managerial interests 
into trusteeship (art. 10), and prohibitions from working for a company which the public 
official supervised or regulated while working for government (art. 17). Articles 7 and 13 
contain the major “auditable” obligation – requiring public officials (politicians) to report 
to the State Commission for the Prevention of Corruption in cases where they suspect a 
conflict of interest may be present in a decision they take. These articles require public 
officials to report to their agency such a conflict of interest (if they are non-political level 
civil servants).8   
 
The Carpatian Customs Agency has adopted a series of regulations -- containing over 300 
provisions -- aimed at implementing the anti-corruption legislative framework. As 
required by the Standards, these regulatory provisions – called controls in the audit 
literature – should be assessed according to the risk to the Customs Agency if non-
compliance occurs (Standards: 2120). The audit team considered the potential costs to the 
Carpatian Customs Administration for non-compliance with these various provisions 
(Standards: 2130).9  The team also discussed these risks at length with the client to 
determine on which controls the audit team would focus their compliance audit (Standards 
2200). The audit team agreed with the clients (in this case, the regional customs house 
heads), the audit coverage, the methods the audit team would use and the type of testing of 
controls used – an exercising known as scoping (Standards: 2220). Two particular 
provisions we chose relate to compliance with the Regulation on Disciplinary Procedures 
                                                 
5 In theory, any customs service also has commitments to uphold international obligations, such as the World 
Customs Organisation’s Revised Arusha Declaration (2003). In practice, however, the Declaration results in 
no legally binding obligation and the text of the abstract principles contained in the Declaration makes 
compliance audit impossible.  
6 See Sherlock (2002) for the discussion of the performance of a similar asset declaration scheme in 
Indonesia and Messick and Simpson (2006) for a list of countries with such schemes currently in place.  
7 For a review of the issues and legal provisions in a number of OECD member states related to similar 
schemes, see Bertok (2003).  
8 Cain et al (2005) provide a critique of conflict of interest disclosure schemes; while Rosenson (2006) find 
that the costs of an ethics law can outweigh the benefits. 
9 See Nigel and Samociuk (2006) for more on the quantification of corruption risks in the operations of a 
public agency.  
relating to the asset declaration scheme and the conflict of interest scheme. Non-
compliance with these articles would result in fines levied by the Civil Service Agency 
and civil financial liability for corruption resulting from control failures.10   
 
The audit team conducted fieldwork through substantive testing – checking to see if 
Customs officials followed the controls – in the mid-2000s. Substantive testing consisted 
of questionnaires given to both managerial-level and employee-level customs officials. 
Covering about 10% of all Customs staff, 599 surveys (400 surveys of employees and 109 
surveys of managerial staff) provided data on compliance practices.11 As discussed below, 
a series of questions also tested attitudes related to the overall “culture of compliance” 
within the Carpatistan Customs Agency. The purpose of internal audit aims to generate 
recommendations which add value and reduce risks (Standards: 2100). As such, we 
choose not to look at (called vouching in the audit literature) the claims of each customs 
official and provided anonymity for all survey responses. In the language of audit, the 
team sought “control deficiencies” (what a social scientist would refer to as institutional 
regulations which provide adverse incentives to agents) instead of “control exceptions” 
(what a social scientist would refer to quite simply as criminal or naughty conduct).    
 
Compliance with Anti-Corruption Regulations 
 
The data show relatively wide-spread anti-corruption control failures. As shown on the 
left-side of Figure 2, between 20% and 40% of staff claimed not to have filed a conflict of 
interest declaration.12 On the other hand, between 75% and 95% of staff claimed to have 
filled in their statement indicating that they are not currently in a conflict of interest. Even 
if staff did face a conflict of interest, the law provides for very weak incentives to declare 
such conflicts. The Conflict of Interest Law stipulates that an investigation of a Customs 
official for conflict of interest would lead only to forcing him or her to file a conflict of 
interest declaration. As such, the relatively senior-level regional customs region managers 
in the (our clients for this engagement) face little liability or regulatory risk from 
employee non-compliance with the conflict of interest scheme.  
 
                                                 
10 In a customs context, control failures implicitly lead to the risk of violating an individual’s procedural and 
civil rights. However, as such rights are notoriously difficult to define, the auditor must bear in mind the 
non-quantitative risks represented by the violation of these rights (Carmona, 2009).  
11 We have scaled our data in the data to prevent identification of the country by the size of its staff, budgets, 
or value of imports. We have applied a consistent method of scaling to ensure that the relationships in the 
data remain consist.  
12 As previously noted, these data reflect customs officers’ own admissions of compliance with the anti-
corruption regulations in place. As a scope limitation, the Internal Affairs department did not (rightly) allow 
the audit team to vouch survey respondents’ answers with conflict of interest and asset declarations on file.  
Figure 2: Perceived Compliance With Anti-Corruption Regulations 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Yes No I Dont Know Yes No I Dont Know
Submitted a conflict of interest declaration Submitted an asset declaration
Note: Data represent perceived rather than actual levels of compliance. We have applied a f ilter to the original 
data to prevent identif ication of the country. Actual data w ill be w ithin 10 percentage points of the actual value.
Source: Based  on audit survey data.   
 
 
The bulk of the risk for non-compliance with the anti-corruption regulations selected in 
this audit focused on un-filed asset declaration forms. As shown on the right side of Figure 
2, between 50% and 70% of employees surveyed indicate that they have not filled in asset 
declarations. According to the Anti-Corruption Law, failure to fill in an asset declaration 
can lead to a fine of between €50 and €150. According to the audit team, if these fines are 
levied (and an average fine of €100 is actually paid) customs staff would (and should) be 
held liable for negligence. The value of the fines from customs staff would equal €590,000 
for the statistical aggregate of Carpatistan we have created from the audit data used from 
another country. Thus, control failure on the collection of asset declarations – irregardless 
of the actual inspection of these inspections (which is not required by law) – poses a 
significant risk to the customs staff.  
 
The hardest (and most creative) part of the audit revolves around making 
recommendations which will address these anti-corruption control failures. The Standards 
provide little guidance on the exact type of recommendations auditors should provide to 
their clients – except that recommendations should aim at decreasing risk and generate a 
net benefit (compared with the cost of implementing the recommendation).13 In the case of 
our audit (and contrary to the advice many internal auditors might give), we did not make 
the conventional recommendation to impose more controls. Instead, we recommended that 
the Carpatian Customs Agency provide awards or install reward mechanisms to reward 
individuals for knowing, following and encouraging the adoption of the agency’s anti-
corruption regulations. Such a recommendation draws from advances in economic science, 
and particularly the theory of mechanism design.14  The literature on compliance indicates 
that regulations should be “incentive-compatible.” Namely, civil servants should be 
offered positive as well as negative incentives for compliance.   
 
The optimal level of controls depends on their (countervailing) effects on compliance and 
productivity. Figure 3a demonstrates the economic logic behind our recommendation for 
an awards scheme. On the one hand, imposing more controls (such as imposing the 
obligation that managers check whether all staff have filled conflict of interest and asset 
declaration forms) would increase compliance. As shown in Figure 3a, the cost of 
imposing one more control increases as level of controls already in place increases 
                                                 
13 Recommendations must “add value” (Standard 2000) by reducing organisational risk through “the 
improvement of governance, risk management, and control processes using a systematic and disciplined 
approach” (Standard 2100).  
14 Garoupa and Klerman (2004) provide much of the theory behind the use of mechanism design in deciding 
on the optimal level of punishment for potential corruption offences.  
(representing increasing marginal costs).15 On the other hand, more controls result in 
lower productivity – through diverting staff time away from controlling import containers, 
checking that traders calculate import taxes correctly and so forth. In other words, 
increases in controls result in lower marginal benefits in terms of customs officers’ 
productivity. Our survey data show that between 20% and 40% compliance represents the 
equilibrium – though of course not optimal -- amount of compliance for submitting asset 
declarations for the level of controls currently in place.   
 
level of controls
marginal
cost/ 
benefits
(measured
in euros)
officer 
productivity
(MR)
compliance 
level
(MC)
Figure 3a: The Marginal Costs and Benefits of Adding Audit Controls to Ensure 
Compliance with Conflict of Interest and Asset Declaration Schemes
c*
100%
(compliance)
ce
(30%)
 
 
Simply adding controls will not improve compliance with the conflict of interest or asset 
declaration schemes. Figure 3b shows the equilibrium level of controls, given the marginal 
costs and benefits faced by Carpatian customs officers. At a level of controls c2, the costs 
of compliance exceed the benefits in terms of increasing customs officers’ productivity. 
Less productive officers have no incentive to comply with such controls (and their 
managers have no incentive to force them to comply). As a result, the level of compliance 
slips back into equilibrium at ce. The “extra controls” (c2-ce) directly correlate with the 
level of non-compliance (controls which customs officers do not comply with). 
Conversely, if management sets the level of controls too low, gains from increased 
officers’ productivity are “lying on the table” – providing managers with increased 
incentives to regulate. At the time of our audit, we observed that managers were not trying 
very hard to increase the number of controls – suggesting over-regulation. The extent of 
non-compliance found in the data suggests that the level of controls exceeds the 
equilibrium level.     
 
                                                 
15 In order to keep the discussion from becoming too abstract, the practical way the Customs Administration 
would increase the level of controls (as suggested in Figures 3) would be to add articles to its Regulation on 
Disciplinary Procedures. Each new article would impose an extra obligation – or add precision to an existing 
obligation – to collect and check conflict of interest and asset declarations of customs staff.   
level of controls
marginal
cost/ 
benefit
officer 
productivity
compliance 
level
Figure 3b: Problem with Simply Increasing Managerial Controls: Excess 
Bureaucracy
c*
100%
(compliance)
ce
(30%)
c1 c2
     
 
Providing incentives to comply with customs anti-corruption regulations – in the form of 
an awards scheme – would increase the equilibrium level of compliance. Figure 3c shows 
the economic logic of such a recommendation as shifting the marginal benefits of 
compliance out through increased officer productivity. Such productivity gains could 
result from increased morale or finding ways of complying without the need for heavy-
handed bureaucracy. As shown in Figure 3c, such an incentive programme may raise the 
equilibrium level of compliance to a number like 80%. At the time of this writing, 
enforcement by the Civil Service Commission (in charge of providing surveillance for the 
asset declaration and conflict of interest scheme) seemed unlikely. However, if such 
enforcement did increase, the marginal costs of compliance would shift outward (fall) – 
thus increasing the equilibrium level of compliance to even 100%.    
 
level of controls
marginal
cost/ 
benefit
officer 
productivity
(MB)
compliance 
level (MC)
Figure 3c: Award Scheme to Provide Incentives to 
Increase Returns to Compliance
100%
compliance
c*
(80%)
 
 
Clearly, the internal auditor – in subsequent performance audits or follow up audits on the 
recommendation made – should ensure that over-compliance does not occur. An awards 
scheme, increased enforcement by the Civil Service Commission, and laws increasing 
administrative liability for non-compliance could result in excessive control. Customs 
officials would spend too much time ensuring they are 100% compliant – resulting (in 
practice) in levels of compliance in excess of 100%. Figure 3d shows the logic behind 
such excessive compliance as the result of defensive compliance. Even after the level of 
controls ensure 100% compliance with the asset declaration or conflict of interest scheme, 
individual customs officers may invest extra time and effort in order to make sure they 
appear as though they are complying. They will make investments in compliance in order 
to prevent even a low probability finding of being in non-compliance. As a result, their 
marginal costs for investing extra effort in compliance drops (relative to their expected 
returns) and excessive control results.16  
 
level of controls
marginal
cost/ 
benefit
officer 
productivity
(MB)
compliance 
level (MC)
Figure 3d: Using Mechanism Design to Lower the Level of Controls Required 
for Full Compliance: The Case of Excess Bureaucracy
100%
compliance
ce
0
 
 
Ignorantia Juris Non Excusat  
 
While ignorantia juris non excusat (ignorance of the anti-corruption regulations in place 
does not excuse non-compliance), such ignorance may explain non-compliance. Such 
explanations form the basis of an internal auditor’s recommendations. Figures 4 show the 
results of a test of customs staff’s knowledge of specific regulatory prohibitions. As shown 
in Figure 4a, between 5% - 20% of Customs staff would either improperly clear goods of a 
friend (or don’t know if they should or not). Roughly between 35% and 55% of Customs 
officers would either improperly buy shares of a company they are clearing (or don’t know 
if they should or not). Thus the data, overall, show that customs officers generally know 
about the provisions contained in the law and the customs agency’s anti-corruption 
regulations. However, Customs staff do not know if they know the regulations. Figure 4b 
shows the extent to which Customs officers think they know anti-corruption regulations. 
As shown in the figure, almost equal proportions of Customs officers feel they know the 
regulations well as those that do not.  
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
no I don't know no I don't know
Figure 4a: Carpatistan Customs Staff Generally Know the 
Anti-Corruption Regulations
Is it conflict of interest to clear
friends goods after hours
Is it conflict of interest
if  buy shares from company 
you are clearing
Source: Based on audit survey data. These data have been scaled using
an algorithm w hich maintains a consistant relationship betw een data in this 
paper.  
Figure 4b: Extent to Which Customs 
Staff Think They Are Informed about 
Anti-Corruption Regulations
0%
10%
20%
30%
1 2 3 4 5
(w ell explained) (not explained)
Source: Based on audit survey data. These data have been 
scaled using an algorithm w hich maintains a consistant 
relationship betw een data in this paper.  
  
No compliance audit would be complete without a test of the controls of systems of 
managerial assurance. Simply put, Customs house managers can not help ensure the 
compliance of their staff unless they receive regular updates about the submission of (or 
                                                 
16 See Helm (2006) for a more complete formulation of this phenomenon.  
problems with) new asset declarations or conflict of interest statements from their staff. 
Figure 5 shows that between 20% to 40% of managers don’t know if customs staff have 
submitted an asset declaration form or declared changes in their assets. Assuming that 
customs staff responded truthfully to the questionnaires used to create Figure 1 (about 
their filling in conflict of interest forms and asset declarations), managers should have 
guessed that the percent of staff complying rests between 26% to 99%. The stated rates of 
compliance for filling in conflict of interest declarations rest at 84% and 31% for asset 
declarations. As such, over 90% of managers guessed incorrectly about the compliance of 
their staff with customs anti-corruption regulations. Clearly, managerial assurance in the 
area of compliance with customs anti-corruption controls requires improvement.  
 
Figure 5: Managerial Perceptions of Staff Compliance with Customs Agency-
Specific Anti-Corruption Regulations
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Note: for example, betw een 50% and 70% of all managers think that less than 20% to 40% of their staff have 
not reported conflicts of interest and roughly 10% to 30% of managers think that over 15% 40% (but less than 
99% of staff have undeclared changes in their assets). 
 
 
In this case, the cheapest and most effective control to put into place requires the person in 
customs headquarters who receives these declarations to provide updates to all customs 
managers about the their staff’s compliance with the Agency’s anti-corruption regulations 
(or develop systems to collect data on such compliance). Our cost-benefit analysis showed 
that such a recommendation would generate €270,000 in overall benefits (higher than any 
of the alternative recommendations might have generated).17 Such an example represents a 
control deficiency (the lack of a regulation which should be present) and can be easily 
remedied (in the first instance) by the stroke of a pen.  
 
Assessing the Culture of Compliance and the COSO Framework 
 
Unlike specific engagements (such as checking if the importers’ computer systems work 
properly), anti-corruption audits should assess the overall organisation’s “control 
environment” – namely its culture of compliance.18 Such audit standards developed in 
1992 precisely in response to audit failures in the USA stemming from these audits’ 
failure to detect and/or prevent corruption. At that time, the Committee on Sponsoring 
Organisations or COSO – a body of audit agencies and experts convoked to discuss ways 
of improving audit performance on engagements (such as compliance with the Foreign 
                                                 
17 We do not discuss the cost-benefit calculations created for each audit recommendation due to lack of 
space. By now, such calculations have become commonplace during regulatory drafting and 
performance/compliance audits of these regulations.  
18 See Rezaee (1995) for more on COSO and the auditor’s role in fighting corruption.  
Corrupt Practices Act) – recommended the assessment of an organisation’s attitudes, 
morale, and general corporate culture. These assessments aim to establish the overall risk 
that management devotes insufficient time and resources toward establishing risk-based 
controls for fraud and corruption. However, measuring such a culture of compliance poses 
significant difficulties in the internal audit paradigm.  
 
Concepts from the social sciences can help conceptualise and measure the culture of 
compliance. The imposition of anti-corruption controls (like all controls) seeks to increase 
risk-adjusted returns. Processes “under control” (exhibiting little variation in performance 
or outcomes) have higher quality over-time (Tarantino, 2008). As shown on the horizontal 
axis of Figure 6a, the standard deviation of a process – denoted by the Greek letter sigma 
or σ – represents risk (as the variation in a process such as the time customs officers 
require to check a particular risk profile in a red channel search). Figure 6a shows the 
upward sloping relationship between risk and return. As customs officers take more risks 
in implementing new practices, conducting more searches of suspicious vehicles and so 
forth, the average return to the entire Customs Agency rises. However, individual customs 
officers can be assumed to be risk averse – lower levels of risk correspond with higher 
personal gains (particularly in an administrative environment that punishes instead of 
rewards smart risk-taking behaviour). The required increased gains needed to convince the 
individual customs officer to take extra risks can be plotted by a downward sloping 
indifference curve. The equilibrium level of risk and return for the Customs Agency will 
be given at a point where institutional incentives match personal ones – for an equilibrium 
return and risk at (re, σe).  
 
σ (risk)
return
r
individual
indifference
collective 
return
Figure 6a: Risk Aversion and the Culture of Compliance
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A system of inexpensive controls may decrease overall risk without compromising return. 
As shown in Figure 6b, the imposition of controls – such as mandatory oversight of all 
asset and conflict of interest declarations – will shift both curves. These controls will raise 
the overall level of returns for all levels of risk (otherwise why install the controls in the 
first place?). Figure 6b portrays such a gain as an upward shift in the collective return line 
(CR – as shown in Figure 6a) from CR1 to CR2. On the other hand, risk averse customs 
officers’ performance will chaff under the increased level of rules – as they need time to 
comply and probably feel some resentment from more surveillance. Figure 6b shows such 
an effect as the counter-clockwise rotation of the individual incentives curve (II – as 
shown in Figure 6a) from II1 to II2. As shown in Figure 6b, while the exact effect on risk 
and return will depend on the shape of each curve, the net effect of imposing more 
controls will lead to decreased risk to the Customs Administration while keeping overall 
returns at the same level. If s1 represents the level of risk before the imposition of 
controls, s2 represents increased risk-adjusted returns from better government, and s3 
represents the decreased risk to individual customs officials from complying with extra 
regulations – then the imposition of controls unambiguously reduces risks. And controls 
increase risk-adjusted returns.... just like they should.  
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Figure 6b: Adding More Controls Requires Customs Officers to Take More 
Risks to Become More Productive
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Techniques from the social sciences can help the internal auditor to construct an index of 
such a culture of compliance. The culture of compliance – as envisioned by the COSO 
standard – represents a tacit or “constructed” variable. The researcher measures the tacit or 
unobservable variable by asking a number of survey questions addressing the concept the 
researcher wishes to measure, and uses some mathematical algorithm on the resulting data 
to construct an unobservable variable (Chia and Koh, 2007). Despite their problems, the 
creation of such tacit or constructed variables comprises the standard way researchers deal 
with hard-to-quantify concepts (like culture). In the case of our anti-corruption compliance 
audit, we sought to measure the extent of risk aversion among Carpati customs officers. 
As theory tells us (as shown in Figure 6a), more or less risk aversion – or controls 
following – does not necessarily result in better or worse performance. Such decisions 
emerge as the result of tastes and technology. As shown though in Figure 7, roughly 20% 
of staff are not risk-averse and seek to exercise their discretion. Roughly between 5% and 
25% seek approval or seek permission for most decisions. The majority of Carpati 
Customs Agency staff fall somewhere in the middle – suggesting that the Agency has a 
culture of compliance which is neither excessively compliant nor dangerously “free-
wheeling.” In short, nothing about the customs agency’s organisational culture explains 
the reasons for the relatively wide-spread non-compliance seen in the data.   
 
Figure 7: Customs Administration's Culture of Compliance
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Testing for Control Deficiencies (Regulatory Failure)   
 
Neither customs managers nor staff thinks that poorly written regulations result in non-
compliance with the Customs Agency’s anti-corruption regulations. As shown in Figure 
8a, customs employees have difficulty determining if anti-corruption regulations are 
unclear or ambiguous. Roughly 5%-25% strongly disagree that regulations have been 
poorly written. About 10% to 30% of employees however strongly agree that “regulatory 
failure” has occurred – namely that regulations are poorly written and distributed. Around 
50% (plus or minus a large margin) find these reasons as relatively unconvincing. 
Interestingly, as shown in Figure 8b, almost exact same proportions of managers find that 
regulations are poorly written (about 10%) while another 10% strongly disagree. Again, 
about 50%-ish are relatively ambivalent about regulatory quality.  
 
Figure 8a: Extent of Regulatory Ambiguity in 
Anti-Corruption Regulation Non-Compliance 
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Figure 8b: Managers' View of Regulatory 
Quality as a Reason for Non-Compliance 
with Anti-Corruption Regs
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In contrast to the techniques discussed earlier for assessing anti-corruption regulatory 
quality, Standard 2310 (in practice) requires auditors to check for themselves – or ‘vouch’ 
in audit terminology – the interview statements. The majority views of Carpatistani 
Customs Administration managers’ and staffs’ opinions about regulatory quality are at 
variance with the auditors’ opinion about the quality of the customs agency’s anti-
corruption regulations. Figure 9 provides an index of the reliability of the provisions 
contained in the Code of Conduct Regulation – with 3 being the most reliable and well-
defined; whereas 1 is the least well defined. A score of zero indicates that the provision 
does not provide a valid legal obligation. As shown, only about 5 articles out of 30 (or 
roughly 30%) provide a basis for guiding customs officers’ conduct. We note that 
Carpati Customs management disagrees with our assessment.19 
 
Figure 9: Quality of Code of Conduct Provisions
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keeping the scores the same). This keeps the overall qualitative analysis unchanged. 
 
 
The repetition of controls signals that either control deficiency (the control was poorly 
designed) or poor regulatory drafting skills – or usually both. Indeed, the Code of Conduct 
Regulation already contains many of the provisions contained in the Regulation on 
Disciplinary Procedures. Figure 9 marks the specific repetitious articles -- showing that 12 
out of 30 (about 30% to 60%) of the provisions repeat the content of the Code of Conduct 
without further precision. In principle, the Code of Conduct should provide the general 
principles which are further elaborated in the Regulation on Disciplinary Procedures. In 
practice, the two regulatory instruments fail to provide adequate and specific instructions – 
accounting for much of the control failure observed in practice.  
 
Figure 10: Repeating Provisions Between Code of Conduct 
and Regualtory Instruments
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Source: audit data. To protect the confidentiality of the client, w e have rearranged the Code of Conduct numbers 
(w hile keeping the scores the same). This keeps the overall qualitative analysis unchanged. 
 
 
Poorly designed controls also indicate a high risk of control failure (that the control fails to 
mitigate the risk the control aimed to reduce).20 Ambiguous and abstract controls usually 
                                                 
19 In a final auditor’s report, the client (and other relevant managerial or supervisory staff) can make 
comments or disagreements with the auditor’s findings. Unlike the assessments conducted in the ad-hoc 
controls studies approach (which are negotiated with the client and represent a single view), an auditor’s 
report may present two opposing views on a recommendation – providing the reader with an independent 
and objective (and even possibly wrong!) view.   
suggest poorly designed controls which are likely to fail. Figure 11 shows the regulatory 
quality of the Regulation on Disciplinary Procedures, as defined by the ambiguity of its 
various articles and their specificity. Ambiguity measures the extent to which the article 
tells the employee “what to do”. Specificity refers to “how to do it.” Again, a 1-3 scale is 
used -- where 3 represents the best score and 1 comprises the worst score. As shown, only 
about 10% or more of the provisions in the regulation contain – according to the auditors 
opinion – an acceptable basis for regulating customs officers’ conduct.  
 
Figure 11: Anti-Corruption Regulatory Quality
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Again, the social sciences – specifically organisational theory -- provide models useful for 
making audit recommendations. The classical audit response to the weak controls 
identified above might be to propose a more elaborate set of instructions for staff. 
However, such recommendations would ignore the organisational environment and the 
extent of the institutionalisation of previous informal practices. While organisational 
interpretations may vary, the audit team determined that Carpatistani Customs works in a 
fast moving organisational environment (with rapidly changing laws as the country 
prepares for adopting a range of new laws, the existing economic crisis of the early and 
mid-2000s and so forth). As shown in Figure 11, the types of problems customs officers 
had to deal with generally are standardised (import procedures usually follow a specific 
routine, most forms are standardised – and so their work is concrete). In this environment, 
the optimal control regime should focus on specific, but flexible controls (Denhardt, 
2000). As such, the audit team recommended that the Regulation on Disciplinary 
Procedures be expanded to provide for guidance – but supplemented mainly by practical 
posters and other guidance. The general principles contained in a typical Code of Conduct 
and need for highly advanced moral reasoning skills required of lawyers (or accountants!) 
are not required for customs officers. The audit team also (naturally) recommended the 
elimination of redundant controls.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
20 In the internal audit methodology, the audit team – after looking at the inherent risk of the area being 
audited, then looks at the quality of controls -- and then focuses its field-work (testing or probing) on areas 
covered by weak controls. In high corruption risk areas where controls are likely to fail, the audit team must 
spend more time and resources conducting fieldwork in order to assess whether bribes or other forms of 
corruption have occurred.  
 
Figure 11: Type of Controls Corresponding to Type of Organisational Environment 
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Fitting Internal Audit into the Broader Debate on Anti-Corruption Regulation 
 
In a public sector audit – particularly an anti-corruption internal audit – a solid grounding 
in the social sciences (economics, politics, and sociology as well as management) provides 
the basis for the audit. In order to receive accreditation by the Institute of Internal 
Auditors, the internal auditor must have passed a series of exams to receive a Certificate in 
Internal Audit (CIA) covering the material roughly on an Masters of Business 
Administration -- including strategy, IT, operations research. However, government 
auditing does not have such a curriculum. Candidates for a certification as in Government 
Auditing Professional know the Standards, and other bits related to government 
accounting and structure. However, as Lowensohn et al. (2007) find in their review of the 
literature, auditor specialisation correlates with perceived audit quality.21 Standard 1210 
requires the audit team to have collectively the specialist skills to complete the audit.  
 
Such findings militate against the use of “toolkits” or “assessment tools” in assessing the 
performance of anti-corruption regulations. The IMF’s Reports on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes and the United Nations’ attempts at providing “toolkits” to assess the 
quality of compliance with anti-corruption regulations provide obvious examples of what 
auditors would call control self-assessment questionnaires. The Global Integrity project 
represents the most developed form of such control self-assessment – where attribute 
sampling checks “in law, is there a national customs and excise agency?” in over 60 
countries. The use of such surveys eliminates the creativity involved in creating 
recommendations (a basic principle of internal audit).22 Aside from the basic 
methodological problems inherent in such benchmarking – as addressed by authors such 
as Sampford (2006) -- such benchmarks and “empirics” also represent the most harmful 
part of the “audit culture” permeating the public sector -- as decried by authors such as 
Hood et al. (1998) and Anechiarico and Jacobs (1996).        
 
Internal audit, on the other hand, provides a disciplined methodology for assessing the 
performance of anti-corruption work within a state organisation. Standard 2100 sums up 
succinctly the role of internal audit – “the internal audit activity must evaluate and 
contribute to the improvement of governance, risk management, and control processes 
using a systematic and disciplined approach.” The internal audit activity requires creativity 
and knowledge – not a standard toolkit – to achieve this improvement. However, the 
                                                 
21 Gendron et al. (2007) provide a valid critique of this approach. They argue (in the case of Canada) that the 
audit agency created the appearance of expert knowledge which it used to bolster the strength of its 
recommendations.  
22 Smith’s (2007) recent proposal for the benchmarking of ethics programmes across all civil services clearly 
represents the culmination of the benchmarking fad.  
internal audit approach can not help the audit team identify anti-corruption risks – where 
studies from the social sciences such Rose-Ackerman (2006) and Reinikka and Svensson 
(2006) proved invaluable to our own work. The internal audit approach can not develop 
recommendations based on theory and tested empirically in contexts wider than in the 
particular engagement – and studies such as Mungiu (2006) and Nonchev (2006) provided 
most valuable. Finally, the internal audit approach can not assist when considering the 
administrative and party-level politics which would affect a recommendation – and studies 
such as Lawson (2009) provide such useful guidance. In short, internal auditing standards 
provide the framework and the social sciences provide the reasoning behind audit 
recommendations.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The internal audit of controls requiring civil servants (such as customs officers) to declare 
their income (and any substantial changes) as well as potential conflicts of interests 
represents a major element in the fight against corruption. To date, the four previous 
methods of evaluating anti-corruption regulatory performance – the systems design 
approach, the ad-hoc controls studies approach, the descriptive legal analysis approach 
and the prescriptive manuals and handbooks 
approach – can not provide specific guidance in a specific circumstance. The anti-
corruption compliance audit – particularly focused on the submission of conflict of interest 
declarations and asset declarations – can form the basis for creative recommendations 
which add more value then they cost to implement. The internal audit approach – as 
enshrined in the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Audit 
(ISPPIA) – can serve as a more valuable basis for evaluating the performance of anti-
corruption regulation than the numerous ad hoc toolkits and measurement tools currently 
available online. More generally, with a greater understanding of the role and methods of 
internal audit in the social sciences, internal audit – and particularly audit findings – can 
contribute to practical questions being posed in the social sciences and the anti-corruption 
literature.  
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